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"When our founding fathers made us one nation, they had this fear — 
that a strong central government might overrun the rights of the people."1 
To prevent this, they elaborated a list of prohibitions limiting the power 
of the federal government. No religion was to be established. The people 
were to enjoy freedom of speech, press, assembly and religious worship. 
Furthermore, a man's life, liberty and property were to be protected 
against arbitrary action by government. These prohibitions, securing 
freedom of expression and the protection of personal liberty, were set 
down in the Bill of Rights, the first ten amendments to the Constitution. 
Initially, these prohibitions were directed primarily against the 
federal government. The respective states, however, in their own consti¬ 
tutions, adopted similar prohibitions protecting the liberty of the people 
against the arbitrary action of state government. Then, after the Civil 
War, the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution was passed. Under this 
Amendment, no state could deprive any person of life, liberty or property 
without due process of law. "Gradually this 'due process' clause came to 
include most of the prohibitions of the Bill of Rights, so that the 
Constitution became complete protection for the people against action of 
p 
both state and federal government. 
■^Edward S. Newman, The Law of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties (New 
York, 1957), P- 7- 
2 
Newman, op. cit., p. 7« 
1 
2 
These rights, protected by the Bill of Rights and by the Fourteenth 
Amendment, are known as "civil liberties." Mr. Justice Cardozo referred 
to them as "the very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty...the fundamen¬ 
tal principles of liberty and justice which lie at the basis of all cur 
civil and political institutions. 
"The civil liberty issues raised by our security problems are more 
ij. 
acute, numerous, and varied than in any other area." The reasons for 
this are not hard to find. The "cold war" has brought an acute sense of 
danger to national security. The Communist threat, that of Soviet aggres¬ 
sion abroad and of Communist subversion at home, has caused great concern 
among governmental officials and the American people. According to 
governmental officials, this threat justifies restraints on liberty which 
would otherwise be indispensable. We live, therefore, in a context of 
balancing safety against freedom, and there is constant dispute over where 
the lines between the two shall be drawn. 
The purpose of this paper is to attempt to investigate the anti¬ 
subversive measures which were instituted by the federal government and 
to suggest the manner and extent, if any, of their infringement upon the 
constitutional rights of the individual which pertain to civil liberties. 
The consequences of anti-subversive laws and programs will also be adum¬ 
brated. 
^Robert E. Cushman, "Civil Liberties," American Political Science 
Review, XXXVII (February, 1944), 2. 
4Robert E. Cushman, Civil Liberties in the United States (New York, 
1956), p. l66. 
3 
"The end of hostilities in 19^-5 brought with it new hope that mankind 
might live in peace. The hope was short-lived. The American people were 
again engaged in a struggle to save democratic institutions and ideals. In 
this world-wide conflict, free men have watched the relentless advance of 
totalitarianism. The independence of many peoples has yielded to intimida¬ 
tion, subversion, treachery, and conquest. 
"Euphemistically called the 'cold war', the struggle has not only 
necessitated comprehensive and unprecedented peacetime adjustments within 
the American economy, but has also extracted a staggering toll in blood and 
treasure."^ It is against this background of events abroad and some sub¬ 
version at home that the American people have undertaken to secure themselves 
and their democratic institutions from destruction. 
In recognition of the apparent dangers to the American democratic 
system, vigorous measures have been adopted by both state and federal govern- 
7 
ments. Some of these measures infringe upon the freedoms for which mankind 
has paid dearly. Freedom of speech, press, and assembly are freedoms which 
are cherished as essential to a democratic society. People also cherish 
freedom from such tyrannies as arbitrary arrest and imprisonment without 
trial. 
In many of the countries of Europe, the civil liberties of the people 
have been destroyed. They have been sacrificed to dictatorial power. Free¬ 
dom of speech, press, and assembly is gone. Citizens may be arrested and 




In April 1956, the Supreme Court invalidated the sedition laws of some 
forty states. (Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U. S. 4-97 > 1956). 
4 
imprisoned without trial. The depth of this tragedy has been deeply 
impressed on the minds of many Americans. It should warn us to be alert to 
recognize and condemn any attack, however subtle, upon our constitutional 
rights. The deadening effect of repression of the thought and life of those 
living under dictatorships should compel us to make sure that our civil 
liberties are neither whittled away in time of peace, nor submerged under 
the supposed necessities of war. 
Wo tradition in America is stronger than our high 
respect for human freedom. We in America have come 
increasingly to believe in the central importance 
of the individual. We believe that every person 
has a dignity and an integrity that society must 
respect. We believe that every person should en¬ 
joy a reasonable opportunity to realize his 
potentialities. To achieve these goals we be¬ 
lieve that each man should enjoy a large measure 
of liberty, and should be subject to a minimum of 
social restraint. 
The First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States forbids 
Congress to make any laws which shall abridge freedom of speech, of the 
press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble. Yet, in recent 
years, the government of the United States has limited these freedoms in 
many ways through its attempt to check subversive activities. Anti-sub¬ 
versive measures have greatly restricted these freedoms. Individuals are 
apprehensive about expressing their beliefs and ideas, printing what they 
would like to and speaking defiantly of governmental practices because 
they may be labeled as subversives or engaging in subversive activities. 
Q 
°Robert K. Carr, American Democracy in Theory and Practice (New York, 
1956), pp. 145-146. 
5 
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In certain loyalty cases, individuals are denied due process of the law.1 
Thus, in the efforts of the federal government to restrain the threat 
to the security of the United States, a great problem has arisen. This 
problem is part of the perennial problem of reconciling and balancing freedom 
and order, liberty and government. On the one hand, there is the problem of 
providing military strength sufficient to defend the nation. On the other 
hand, there is the problem of protecting against subversive or potentially 
subversive elements in the population without at the same time violating 
basic civil liberties which are a necessary condition of a free and open 
society. 
To attain proper perspective in understanding the problem of civil 
liberties and anti-subversive measures after the first World War, it is 
feasible to review briefly previous threats to American freedom and the 
manner in which the government responded to them. 
The first piece of sedition lav/ in the history of the United States 
was enacted in 1798* It was, significantly, a peacetime law. Revolution 
and war had engulfed Europe, bringing fear that the United States was en¬ 
dangered by revolutionary doctrines being spread in our midst by foreigners. 
President Washington and his successor, John Adams, had been subjected to 
bitter attacks, particularly by those who wanted the United States to 
assist France in her revolutionary effort against the other European powers. 
"Adams and his partisans in Congress could see no better way of defending 
themselves than through the passage of a group of acts known collectively 
^Maxwell Steward, "Loyalty in a Democracy," Public Affairs Pamphlet, 
No. 179 (February, 1952), p. 8. 
as the Alien and Sedition Acts. ..10 
The Alien Law allowed the President to compel the 
departure of aliens whom he judged dangerous to 
the peace and safety of the United States or 
suspected, on reasonable grounds, of treasonable 
or secret machinations against our government. 
The Sedition Law punished false, scandalous, and 
malicious writings against the government, either 
House of Congress, or the President, if published 
with intent to defame any of them, or to excite 
against them the hatred of the people, or to 
stir up sedition or to excite resistance of law, 
or to aid any hostile designs of any foreign 
nation against the United States. 
This statute, which was undoubtedly contrary to the spirit and letter 
of the First Amendment, was enforced, but never came to a test in the Supreme 
Court. It expired the day before Jefferson became President. With 
Jefferson as President, all fines collected under the Sedition Law were re¬ 
paid and those imprisoned were pardoned. Jefferson stood for freedom of 
speech and the press. 
The American Civil War was the first war following 
the adoption of our present Constitution that pre¬ 
sented any serious question of the violation of 
civil liberties by the federal government. Congress 
passed no laws restricting freedom of speech, of the 
press, or of assembly. No espionage or sedition laws 
were enacted.-^ 
•^William Anderson and Edward Weidner, American Government (4th ed.; 
New York, 1953), p. 3^1- 
■^Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Free Speech in the United States (Cambridge, 
1942), p. 27. 
12 
Robert E. Cushman, "Civil Liberty After the War," American Political 
Science Review, XXXVIII (February, 1944), 1.5. 
7 
Congress did pass two measures strengthening the law dealing with treason 
and increasing the penalty for conspiracy against the government, but these 
measures were not vigorously enforced. Instead, most of the governmental 
activity that was said to threaten civil liberty was undertaken by the 
President upon nis own responsibility. 
President Lincoln suspended the writ of habeas corpus, first in 
certain crucial areas and later, after Congressional authorization, through¬ 
out the country. Military Courts tried civilians, without the protections 
of grand and petit jury procedure, even for capital offenses. 
In the words of Charles A. Beard: 
Editors of hostile journals were put in prison, 
their papers suspended, their newsboys arrested. 
Peace meetings were broken up and the organizers 
sent to jail. Members of the Maryland legislature, 
the Mayor of Baltimore, and local editors accused 
of holding obstructive views were arrested on 
military order; though they were charged with no 
overt act of any kind, they were held in jail and 
denied the privilege of a hearing before a Civil 
Magistrate. All over the country, the net was 
thrown out to catch offenders — in the theater 
of war, in the border states where there was 
constant danger of new uprisings, and far away in 
the North to the boundaries of Canada, where the 
ordinary criminal courts were competent to handle 
the most fiery advocate of secession.^3 
Any specific legislature authorization, under which persons who discouraged 
men from enlisting, who resisted the draft, or who engaged in other disloyal 
practices were subjected to martial law and trial by military commission. 
"The record reveals that in pursuance of this policy thousands of persons 
■^Cited by Maurice Goldbloom, American Security and Freedom (New York, 
195^), PP* 6-7. 
8 
were tried by military tribunals and many were imprisoned. Likewise, 
newspapers in many of the largest cities of the country were suppressed by 
means of military order. "Lincoln himself was well aware of the threat 
to freedom inherent in his policies...."^ 
The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment will be used as the 
prime elements in the determination of the impact of the anti-subversive 
measures upon civil liberties. The relevant clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment states, in essence, that no person within the jurisdiction of 
the laws of the United States may be deprived of life, liberty, or property 
without due process of the law. 
14 
Carr, op. cit., pp. 158-9» 
15Ibid. 
CHAPTER II 
RECENT LAWS PASSED TO PROTECT NATIONAL SECURITY 
World War I witnessed serious threats to civil liberty from government 
in the United States. "Congress and the state legislatures vied with each 
other in passing espionage, sedition, and similar laws that seriously 
restricted freedom of speech and press and other liberties."'*" Moreover, 
this lessening of civil liberty occurred even though at no time during that 
war was there any immediate danger to the safety of our institutions, such 
as had existed during the Civil War. 
Recent laws which limit civil liberties began with the Espionage Act 
of 1917. Congress declared war on Germany on April 6, 1917* On May 18, it 
enacted the Selective Service Act for raising a national army. Many people 
believed conscription to be necessary, but some were opposed to the draft. 
These few spread propaganda against the law. 
Beside the military and civilian organizations designed to notify the 
men subject to registration and active duty, the government had at its 
disposal several criminal statutes enacted during the Civil War. They were 
used to punish conspiracies by those who sought to obstruct recruiting or who 
sought, through speeches and publications, to induce men to evade the draft. 
"The Justice Department felt that the statutes were incomplete and that the 
p 
treason statutes were of little service." 
'''Robert K. Carr, American Democracy in Theory and Practice (New York, 
1956), p. 159. 
2 
Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Free Speech in the United States (Cambridge, 
19^2), p. 39- 
9 
10 
Therefore, although it was probable that under the circumstances the existing 
conspiracy statutes would have taken care of any serious danger to the 
prosecution of the war, new legislation was demanded. On June 15, 1917, 
Congress enacted the Espionage Act. 
The Act, among other things, outlawed: 
The wilful utterance of false statements with intent 
to interfere with the operation or success of the 
armed forces of the United States; the wilful causing 
of or attempt to cause insubordination, disloyalty, 
mutiny, or refusal of duty in the armed forces of the 
United States, and the wilful obstruction of the re¬ 
cruiting or enlistment service of the United States. 
Penalties of fines of not more than $10,000 or im¬ 
prisonment for not more than twenty years or both are 
provided.-^ 
Eleven months later, the Espionage Act was expanded. On May l6, 1918, 
nine more offenses were added. These offenses made it a crime for: 
(l) saying or doing anything with intent to obstruct 
the sale of United States Bonds, except by way of 
bona fide and not disloyal advice; (2) uttering, 
printing, writing or publishing any disloyal, profane, 
scurrilous, or abusive language intended to cause con¬ 
tempt or scorn of the government of the United States; 
(3) or the Constitution; (4) or the flag; (5) or the 
uniform of the Army or Navy; (6) or any language in¬ 
tended to incite resistance to the United States or 
promote the causes of its enemies; (7) urging any 
curtailment of production of any things necessary to 
the prosecution of the war with intent to hinder its 
prosecution; (8) advocating, teaching, defending or 
suggesting the doing of any of these acts; and (9) words 
or acts supporting or favoring the cause of any country 
at war with us pr opposing the cause of the United 
States therein. 
JEdwin S. Newman, Law of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties (New York, 
1957), p. 25. 
^Chafee, op. cit., pp. 40-4l. 
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Whoever committed any of these offenses during the war was liable to the 
maximum penalty of $10,000 fine or twenty years imprisonment or both. 
The 1918 Amendment was repealed on March 3> 1921. The original 
Espionage Act of 1917> however, was still in force when the Second World War 
began. Prosecutions for wartime violations of the act continued long after 
the war and many were fined or imprisoned. The Supreme Court sustained the 
Act as within the powers of Congress, but a few justices dissented.^ Many 
publications were banned from the mails and their second class mailing pri¬ 
vileges revoked for similar utterances. 
The most influential of the Supreme Court cases was the Schenck case 
of 1919 (Schenck v. United States, 249 U. S. 47). In this case, Justice 
Holmes announced the rule of "clear and present danger" to justify punishing 
Schenck for distributing pamphlets urging resistance to the draft. Speaking 
for the unanimous Court, Justice Holmes said: 
...The question in every case is whether the words used 
are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature 
as to create a clear and present danger that they will 
bring about the substantial evils that Congress has a 
right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and 
degree. When a nation is at war many things that might 
be said in time of peace are such a hindrance to its effort 
that their utterance will not be endured so long as men 
fight and that no Court could regard them as protected by 
any constitutional right. 
Tnis doctrine could be so construed as to either protect or restrict 
freedom of speech. An understanding of the application of the "clear and 
present danger" test can be reached by analyzing its three component parts: 
^Schenck v. United States, 249 U. S. 47 (1919), Frohwerk v. United 
States,"249 U. S. 204 (1919), Debs v. United States, 249 U. S. 211 (1919), 
Abrams v. United States, 250 U. S. 6l6 (l920), Schaefer v. United States, 
251 U. S. 468 (1920). 
^Schenck v. United States, 249 U. S. 47 (1919)- 
12 
that there is a danger, that it be clear, and that it be present. 
A due consideration for the first of these elements ought to make it 
plain that trivial statements should never be prosecuted. In this same 
category are general criticisms. It is evident, then, that whether a danger 
exists depends in part on the nature of the statement, in part on the 
accompanying circumstances. The test further requires that the supposed 
danger be "clear" — that is, "there must be a reasonable expectation that 
the harmful consequence prohibited by law will ensue. It is not enough to 
say that the words used had the 'tendency' to produce such result. 
Finally, the danger must be "present." "That is to say, it must be imminent 
in point of time. The stress is less on the words themselves than on the 
Q 
circumstances of their utterance and the situation of those uttering them." 
"The 'clear and present danger' is not an absolute standard that can 
be applied like a yardstick equally in all circumstances. It is a relative 
concept to be applied in the light of the particular circumstances in which 
it is invoked.A danger that is clear in one set of circumstances may not 
be clear in another set, and what is present in one instance may not be in 
another. In any case in which the "clear and present danger" test is invoked, 
the courts must decide "whether the gravity of the evil, discounted by its 
improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary to 
avoid the danger."^1 What this means is that, in determining whether the 
requisite clarity and immediacy is present to justify a restriction on speech, 
^Osmond K. Fraenkel, Our Civil Liberties (New York, 1944), pp. 68-69. 
®Ibid., p. 69• 
^Leo Pfeffer, The Liberties of an American (Washington, 1956), p. 86. 
10Ibid. 
13 
due consideration must be given to the degree of gravity of the evil sought 
to be prevented. 
The Supreme Court has., from time to time, modified or found inapplicable 
the "clear and present danger" doctrine. In 1937, for example, it gave as one 
of its reasons for reversing a conviction of a Communist party organizer the 
failure of the state to show that his activities constituted a clear and 
present danger.This doctrine has not been expressly overruled, but the 
Court held in 1951; in effect, that the test is inapplicable in a case of 
12 
conspiracy to overthrow the government. 
It has been granted that the same degree of expression of freedom of 
speech and press cannot be enjoyed in wartime as in peacetime. But the terms 
of the Sspionage Act of 1917 made it a criminal offense for an individual to 
print, utter, or publish any language which would be contemptible of the 
government. This right to criticize the government, even though it may 
appear to be contemptible at times, is embodied in the right of dissent 
which is an important part of our democratic heritage. This act clearly 
placed a restriction on the freedoms of the First Amendment. However, "the 
operation of this far-reaching restraint upon speech and press was limited 
by Congress to periods of actual warfare."“3 Those individuals who held 
opposite views of the government were apprehensive about overtly expressing 
them. Persons were, in essence, told what they could not express freely by 
•^Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U. S. 242 (1937)* 
l^Dennis v. United States, 3^+1 U. S. 494 (1951) • The Supreme Court 
applied the "bad tendency" test in Gitlow v. Hew York, 268 U. S. 652 (1925). 
^Carr, op. c it., p. 190. 
14 
the act. 
During the years immediately preceding the outbreak 
of the Second World War, there began the most 
extended period of anti-sedition activity in the 
nation's history. Never before has the government 
of the United States—produced such a volume of 
executive orders and statutes aimed at sedition.^ 
Hearings on the first peacetime federal sedition law since 1798 began in- 
1935* The bill was thoroughly debated and passed the House by an overwhelming 
majority in July, 1939* Concern over the danger of subversive activity from 
aliens within the United States prompted Congress to pass this new legisla¬ 
tion. It became law on July 28, 1940, and was known as the Alien Registra¬ 
tion Act, also commonly known, as the Smith Act. 
The five purposes of the statute as set forth in a report of the Senate 
Judiciary Committee, are as follows: 
(l) to prohibit the advocacy of insubordination, dis¬ 
loyalty, mutiny, or refusal of duty in the military 
or naval forces of the United States; (2) to prohibit 
the advocacy of the overthrow or destruction of any 
government in the United States by force or violence; 
(3) to add several additional grounds for the deporta¬ 
tion of aliens to those already provided by law; 
(4) to permit the suspension, subject to Congressional 
review, of deportation of aliens in certain 'hardship 
cases ' when the ground for deportation is technical 
in nature and the alien proves to be of good moral 
character, and (5) to require the registration and 
fingerprinting of aliens.T5 
The official name of the Act would suggest that the Act would only apply to the 
five purposes stated above. "Once Congress had lashed itself into such 
anger against supposedly subversive aliens, it is small wonder that it made 
“4Roscoe Pound, Introduction to American Government (Harrisburg, 1954), 
p. 115. 
•^Report of Committee on the Judiciary of the United States Senate on 
Prevention of Subversive Activities and Registration of Aliens (Washington, 
1940), pp. 1-2. 
15 
a clean job by throwing citizens into the statute too."lü The Federal 
Sedition Act of 19^0 is Title I of the so-called Alien Registration Act. 
will be simplest to discuss the provisions section by section. 
Section I. (A) It shall be unlawful for any person, with 
intent to interfere with, impair, or influence the loyalty, 
morale, or discipline of military or naval forces of the 
United States:— 
(1) to advise, counsel, urge, or in any manner cause 
insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny, or refusal of duty 
by any member of the military or naval forces of the 
United States; or 
(2) to distribute any written or printed matter 
which advises, counsels, or urges insubordination, dis¬ 
loyalty, mutiny, or refusal of duty by any member of the 
military or naval forces of the United States  
Section 2. (A) It shall be unlawful for any person— 
(1) to knowingly or wilfully advocate, abet, advise, 
or teach the duty, necessity, desirability, or propriety 
of overthrowing or destroying any government in the United 
States by force or violence.... 
(2) with the intent to cause the overthrow or destruction 
of any government in the United States, to print, publish, 
edit, issue, circulate, sell, distribute, or publicly dis¬ 
play any written or printed matter advocating, advising, or 
teaching the duty, necessity, desirability, or propriety of 
overthrowing or destroying any government in the United 
States by force or violence. 
(3) to organize or help to organize any society, group, 
or assembly of persons who teach, advocate, or encourage 
the overthrow or destruction of any government in the 
United States by force or violence; or to be or become a 
member of, or affiliate with, any such society, group, or 
assembly of persons, knowing the purposes thereof.... 
Section 3* It shall be unlawful for any person to attempt 
to commit, or to conspire to commit, any of the acts pro¬ 
hibited by the provisions of this title. 
16 
Chafee, op. cit., p. kk6. 
It 
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Section 4. Any written or printed matter of the character 
described in section 1 or section 2 of this Act, which is 
intended for use in violation of this Act, may be taken 
from any house or other place in which it may be found, or 
from any person in whose possession it may be, under a 
search warrant issued pursuant to the provisions of title 
XI Jot the Espionage Act of 19177- 
Section 5- Any person who violates any of the provisions 
of this title shall, upon conviction thereof, be fined 
not more than $10,000 or imprisoned for not more than ten 
years, or both....-*-7 
This act resulted in several early trials and convictions of Communists 
in federal district courts, but it was not until the famous case of the 
eleven Communist leaders that the Supreme Court passed upon and upheld its 
constitutionality. In this case, the Communist leaders were convicted of 
a conspiracy to organize a group to advocate the overthrow of the government 
by force and violence. The principal argument used in defense of the Com¬ 
munists was that their activities had not constituted a "clear and present 
danger." But the majority of the Court seemed to have held that the Holmesian 
"clear and present danger" test could not be applied to cases of criminal 
conspiracy; that a "clear and probable danger" test was better adapted to 
such cases. "It declared that it is the existence of the conspiracy which 
creates the danger. If the ingredients of the reaction are present, we cannot 
bind the Government to wait until the catalyst is added. Two justices dis¬ 
sented, one declaring that he could see no danger in a group of Communists — a 
17 
Report of the Committee on the Judiciary of the United States Senate 
on Prevention of Subversive Activities and Registration of Aliens (Washington, 
1940), pp. 2-5- 
18 
Dennis et al. v. United States, 34l U. S. 494 (1951)• 
17 
few miserable merchants of unwanted ideas. 
Following the Dennis case, several other Communist leaders were 
successfully prosecuted, under the Smith Act. Eut the question of just what 
constituted advocacy to overthrow of the government within the meaning of 
the Smith Act was not fully clarified in any of those cases. In 1957, in 
the case of Yates v. United States,^ the Supreme Court held that the Act 
is violated not by an abstract advocacy to overthrow, but only when those 
to whom the advocacy is addressed are urged to do something, now or in the 
future, rather than merely to believe in something. This decision did not 
overrule the Dennis case. On the contrary, the Supreme Court cited with 
approval the trial court's instruction to the jury in the Dennis case, which 
was that the law prohibited advocacy of action to overthrow the government, 
in language reasonably calculated to incite persons to such action. As 
Justice Black pointed out in a concurring opinion in the Yates case, "indi¬ 
viduals may still be convicted for agreeing to talk as distinguished from 
21 
agreeing to act." 
The official title of the Act would make one expect a statute concerned 
only with fingerprinting foreigners and similar administrative matters. 
"Indeed that was the impression received from the newspapers at the time of 
its passage. Wot until months later was it realized that the statute con¬ 
tained the most drastic restrictions on freedom of speech ever enacted in 
the United States during peace. It was no more limited to the registration 
19 Ibid. 





of aliens than the Espionage Act of 1917 was limited to spying." Most of 
the Alien Registration Act was not concerned with registration, and the very 
first part of it had nothing to do with aliens. Just as the Act of 1917 
gave us a wartime sedition law, the 194c Act gave us a peacetime law — for 
everybody, especially United States citizens. 
It seems that in a country which is committed to the principles of 
individual freedom and liberty, no one should be denied the same whether he 
is Communist, Fascist, or what. Of course, allowing for special circumstances 
such as when the use of these principles by individuals would tend to incite 
a rebellion against our government. However, the Smith Act placed tremendous 
restrictions on the individual liberty of all persons within the territorial 
boundaries of the United States. People could only express themselves in a 
restricted manner. 
The end of World War II, the emergence of the "cold war" with the U. S. 
S. R., the worldwide threat of a Communist revolution, and the evidences that 
Communists in the United States were engaged in subversive activities brought 
fears for the national safety that quickly produced a new crop of anti-sub¬ 
versive laws. This time it was not by the newly elected President, but by 
three Senators who were inserting bills, which they Introduced in Congress. 
The basic political theme of 19^9 and the subsequent years for these bills was 
The recent successes of Communist methods in other 
countries and the nature and control of the world 
Communist movement itself present a clear and present 
danger to the security of the United States and to 
22 
Chafee, op. cit., p. 77l. 
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the existence of free American institutions, and make 
it necessary that Congress, in order to preserve the 
sovereignty of the United States as an independent 
nation...enact appropriate legislation recognizing 
the existence of such world wide conspiracy and 
designed to prevent it from accomplishing its pur¬ 
pose in the United States.^3 
The new sedition law began in the spring of 1949, as the Mundt-Nixon 
Bill because it was sponsored by Senator Carl Mundt of South Dakota and 
Congressman Richard M. Nixon, who then was a leading member of the House un- 
American Activities Committee. It passed the House of Representatives by 
a big margin but failed of passage in the Senate. It might have suffered a 
similar fate the following year if the Korean conflict had not broken out. 
The excitement caused by the battle with Communists carried the anti-Communist 
bill triumphantly through both Houses of Congress. By then, it had been re¬ 
named the McCarran Bill after Senator Pat McCarran, of Nevada. Truman vetoed 
the bill as unnecessary and objectionable, but it was passed with little 
opposition in either House on September 23, 1950* and thus became the third 
peacetime sedition law in our national history. The 1950 sedition law is 
officially entitled the Subversive Activities Control Act, but commonly called 
the McCarran Act. 
The Act makes it 'unlawful for any person to perfora any act which would 
substantially contribute to the establishment within the United States of a 
totalitarian dictatorship, the direction and control of which is to be vested 
in foreign hands. The Act further requires all Communist organizations to 
register with the Attorney General, but a Subversive Activities Control Board, 
^Zechariah Chafee, Jr., 'The Blessings of Liberty (New York, 195°), 
pp. 117-118. 
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sitting practically as a court, passes upon whether or not an organisation 
is one of "Communist Action" or "Communist front" and upon whether a parti¬ 
cular individual is a member of a Communist Action Organization (member of 
such organisations must register also). 
The Communist Action Organization is any organization in 
the United States, other than an accredited diplomatic 
mission, which is substantially directed, dominated or 
controlled by the foreign government or the foreign 
organization. The 'Communist front organization' is 
any organization in the United States which is sub¬ 
stantially directed, dominated, or controlled by a 
Communist-action organization, a Communist foreign 
government, or the world Communist movement.^4 
The Board is required to conduct open hearings and all evidence must be 
included in the record. Furthermore, the evidence is subject to cross-examina¬ 
tion by counsel. Appeal may be had from the Board to the Court of Appeals of 
the District of Columbia and to the Supreme Court, if that tribunal grants 
permission. Ko Communist organizations have come forward to register with 
the Attorney General, naturally, they have waited for the Board to act and 
that action has been slow. It was only in April, 1953; after hearings lasting 
nearly two years, that the Board ordered the Communist Party to register as 
a "Communist action organisation," and three more years before the Supreme 
Court ordered the Board to give the Communist Party a new hearing on the 
ground that new evidence disclosed that prejudiced testimony may have been 
received at the first hearing. J In later proceedings, the Board again held 
that the Communist Party should register, but as of July, 1962, it had not 
2k 
Chafee, The Blessings of Liberty, op. cit., pp. 119-120. 
^Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 351 U. S. 
115 (195ST 
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complied, with the order. 
During the Second World War, the government took the customary pre¬ 
cautions to prevent enemy aliens from engaging in espionage and sabotage. 
Its security measures went much further in respect to Japanese-Americans. 
By executive order, 112,000 of them, two-thirds of whom were native-born 
American citizens were evacuated from the Pacific Coast area and held in 
detention camps, and several hundred citizens in other defense areas were 
required to find residence elsewhere. 
"There is little doubt, however, that a war, in this age of H-bombs, 
guided missiles, and scientific sabotage, would lead the government to take 
immediate steps to round up all potential fifth columnists, aliens or citizens.' 
Tie Emergency Detention Act of 1950, Title II of the McCarran Act, seems to 
recognize the inevitability of such action and outlines the procedures to be 
followed. It states that when the United States is at war, the President 
may proclaim the existence of an "Internal Security Emergency." Upon the 
issue of such proclamation, the Attorney General is required to detain those 
persons deemed likely to engage in espionage or sabotage. Any person appre¬ 
hended for detention must, within forty-eight hours, be brought before a 
hearing officer for a preliminary hearing. The officer is required to in¬ 
form the person under arrest of the grounds for his detention, of his rights 
to counsel, of his right to refrain from making any statement and of the 
fact that any statement made by him may be used against him. 





The person under arrest may introduce evidence on his own behalf and 
cross-examine witnesses against him. If the apprehended person cannot 
convince the hearing officer that he is not a potential fifth columnist, he 
may carry his case to the Board of Detention Review. From the decision of the 
Board, an individual may appeal to the courts, with the possibility of going 
even to the Supreme Court. 
The fact which stands out here is that an individual, citizen or alien, 
who has been convicted of no crime, but who is deemed to be potentially 
dangerous to the security of the United States, may be detained. Such action 
Is not in accordance with conventional civil liberties even though few would 
say that the emergency it is designed to meet would not require some such 
actions. Another fact which stands out is that of determining the criteria 
for detaining individuals; how they are to be applied; who is to determine 
them. All this would lessen the emphasis on individual rights because cf the 
subjection involved. 
"In spite of the elaborate safeguards set up here, there will be sharp 
controversy over the propriety of interning an American citizen on the basis, 
not of lawful conduct, but of what officers of the government believe he will 
'probably' do."^1' 
Truman pointed out in his veto message that the language of the McCarran 
Act is so broad and vague that it might well result in penalising the legiti¬ 
mate activities of people who are not Communists at all, but loyal citizens. 
"While purporting to be necessary to preserve free American institutions, the 
McCarran Act gravely impairs some of the most precious of those institutions, 
freedom of speech and press and assembly, which our ancestors put at the very 
p y 
‘Robert Cushman, Civil Liberties in the United States (Rew York, 1956), 
p. 129. 
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beginning of the Bill of Rights."2® In Mr. Truman's words: 
It would put the United States into the thought-control 
business. It could give government officials vast 
powers to harass all of our citizens in the exercise 
of their rights of free speech.29 
Mr. Truman also stated in his veto message that: 
In a free country, we punish men for crimes they commit, 
but never for opinions they have. And the reason this 
is so fundamental to freedom is not...that it protects 
the few unorthodox from suppression by the majority. 
To permit freedom of expression is primarily for the 
benefit of the majority because it protects criticisms and 
criticism leads to progress.®^ 
Beside putting restrictions on freedom of speech, press, and assembly, 
the passport section of the McCarran Act puts restrictions on the freedom of 
movement of an American citizen who has legitimate reasons for going abroad. 
"The compulsory registration of 'Communist front organizations' re¬ 
stricts the normal educational activities and processes of forming views on 
public questions because of the expression and exchange of opinions without 
any necessary relation to any unlawful action."3"^ 
The dangers of this measure to our civil liberties were foreseen by 
Representative Helen Douglas (D. California). In the debate over the 
passage of the measure, she answered those who favored it by saying: 
...Upon this we all agree: Spies and traitors must be 
routed out, prosecuted and punished. Subversive ele¬ 
ments are poor security risks and must be removed from 
28„, 
Chafee, The Blessings of Liberty, op. cit., p. 137. 
29 7 lb id. 
30lbid., p. 138. 
31Ibid., pp. 138-139. 
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Government service and from defense jobs. I not only- 
support complete internal protection, I demand it.... 
But I will not sacrifice liberty...on the altar of 
hysteria.... The so-called Mundt-Nixon Bill and all 
bills patterned after it will begin...destruction. 
I will vote against them.32 
Congressman Marcantonio, in speaking on the constitutionality of the 
measure, said: 
...You violate the Fifth Amendment... you require that 
members of certain organizations must register. If 
they do not...they are subject to five years imprison¬ 
ment... but if they do, what happens to them?... You 
deprive them of the right to travel, the right to work 
in Government, even in plants...you are also violating 
the First Amendment...when you label a person, you set 
up a restriction of freedom of speech.3o 
32 
Cited by Jeralyn Y. Robinson, 'The Internal Security Act of 1950: A 
Study in National Security versus Individual Freedom" (Unpublished Master's 
Thesis, Department of Political Science, Atlanta University, 1952), p. 23. 
33 
Ibid., p. 24. 
CHAPTER III 
THE MAINTENANCE OF LOYALTY AND SECURITY 
"Cold war" tensions were largely responsible for the inauguration of 
the President's loyalty program. There were other factors, too: "The 
cumulative effect of ten years of charges that subversives were harbored by 
the Administration and, after the war, renewed imputations of disloyalty, 
motivated to some extent by political considerations.""'' 
The background of investigations into loyalty of government employees 
dates back to 1939, when Congress passed the Hatch Act, among other things, 
making it unlawful for any government employee to have "membership in any 
political party or organization which advocates the overthrow of our consti¬ 
tutional form of government in the United States." This was followed in 
1941 by a Congressional appropriation to the FBI to inquire into subversive 
-ft 
activities among government employees and by the attachment of riders to 
appropriations bills forbidding payment to persons who advocated or who were 
members of organizations advocating the overthrow of the government of the 
United States. As applied to cut off the salaries of several federal em¬ 
ployees during the war, these riders were declared unconstitutional as bills 
■X- 
of attainder. 
"Roscoe Pound, Introduction to American Government (Harrisburg, 1954), 
p. 120. 
An irrelevant piece of legislation or bill which is attached to an 
important bill for its passage because otherwise it would be opposed. 
*A bill of attainder is one by which a legislature finds a person guilty 
of an offense and seeks to punish him for it without court trial. In the case 
United States v. Lovett, 328 U. S. 303 (1-946), these riders were declared 
unconstitutional as bills of attainder. 
25 
26 
During the war, a start toward a comprehensive loyalty check for 
government employees was undertaken. This reached a climax in 19^6, when 
President Truman promulgated his Loyalty Order requiring investigation of all 
employees in the executive branch and of all persons seeking employment. This 
was the first formal and systematic plan to eliminate "fifth columnists" and 
similar types from the federal service. 
The program called for denying federal employment when, on all the 
evidence, reasonable grounds exist for the belief that the person involved 
is disloyal to the government of the United States. "In 1951* the President 
altered the Order to bar persons about whose loyalty there was 'reasonable 
2 
doubt'. The term 'reasonable doubt' means doubt based on reason." The 
application of the term to special loyalty cases can weaken the emphasis on 
individual rights in the government's loyalty program. In order to establish 
criteria by which disloyalty could be measured, the Order required the com¬ 
piling by the Attorney General of a list of subversive organizations. Ori¬ 
ginally this list was developed without any hearings and without any opportu¬ 
nity on the part of listed organizations to dispute the claim of being sub¬ 
versive. In 1951, however, the Supreme Court decided that for the Attorney 
General to place organizations on a subversive list without giving them a 
3 
hearing was not permissible. 
When the Truman loyalty program was set up in 19^7, for the express 
purpose of barring from federal employment persons who were disloyal, it was 
Q 
^Edward S. Newman, Law of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties (New York, 
1957), P. 35- 
3 
Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 3^1 U. S. 123 (1951)* 
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clearly necessary to define., if possible, what "disloyalty" means. The 
Order did not attempt to define "loyalty," but only "disloyalty." "A clear 
and precise definition was obviously impossible, since here, as in the case 
of the term 'un-American,' the meaning of 'disloyalty' is determined largely 
4 
by subjective rather than objective tests." An effort was made, however, to 
guide loyalty boards in making determinations of disloyalty, and the Order 
made a list of types of behavior which might lead to a conclusion that an 
employee was disloyal. "There were listed a number of items not open to 
debate, such as acts of treason, sabotage, espionage, and other crimes against 
national security. Much less definite was the test of sympathetic affi¬ 
liation with any organization designated by the Attorney General as Communist, 
Fascist, or subversive."^ 
What stands out here is the fact that a man could be branded as dis¬ 
loyal to the United States and deprived of his job for conduct, associations, 
or utterances so vaguely described (or not described at all) that he could 
not possibly have foreseen that they would constitute disloyalty. Nor did 
the order give him a clearer picture of what would be held to constitute dis¬ 
loyalty in the future. 
The standards by which persons were dismissed from the federal service 
under the loyalty program were sharply criticized. It was felt that they 
lacked sharpness of definition and that, as applied, they had, in many cases, 
4 
Robert Cushman, Civil Liberties in the United States (New York, 195<o), 
pp. 182-183. For a discussion of various problems of determining and applying 
criteria of national loyalty, see Henry Steele Commager, Freedom, Loyalty, Dis¬ 
sent (Hew York, 195*0 > and Allan Barth, Loyalty of Free Men (New York, 195l)'«' 
5 
Ibid., p. 183. 
6Ibid. 
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resulted in injustice. Furthermore, they provided no answer to the problem 
of "security risks" who were admittedly loyal. "All disloyal persons are 
security risks, but not all security risks are disloyal. 
Five rights which were long considered inalienable 
for American citizens have become inoperative for 
government employees. They include: (l) the pre¬ 
sumption of innocence until guilt is proved; (2) the 
doctrine of guilt is personal and cannot be computed 
on the basis of relationship or association; (3) the 
right of the accused to be informed of the charges 
made against him in order that he may prepare his 
defense; (4) the right of the accused to confront 
and cross-examine his accusers; and (5) immunity 
against being tried a second time for a charge on 
which acquittal has been won. 
"Under the Truman Loyalty Program nearly five million loyalty checks 
were made, a few hearings conducted, and 557 persons removed from or denied 
employment for loyalty reasons. But about ten times that number resigned 
during investigation of their cases or prior to adjudication of them."9 
The loyalty program has been criticized on the grounds that it has 
undermined employee morale and because employees in loyalty proceedings have 
been denied several basic rights. 
Before the loyalty program became a part of our 
democratic process, we were rejoicing in an era in 
which the public conscience was newly awakened to 
the meaning and importance of our traditions of 
civil rights and liberties. In case after case, 
the Supreme Court was supporting and advancing 
those rights. The Court was extending federal 
protection to freedom of speech in cases of in¬ 
vasion by states. The theory was being advanced 
1 Cushman, op. cit., p. 183• 
^Maxwell Steward, "Loyalty in a Democracy," Public Affairs Pamphlet, 
No. 179 (New York, 1952), p. 8. 
9 Claudius Johnson, American National Government (New York, i960), p. 588- 
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that freedoms of the First Amendment to the Consti¬ 
tution have a preferred position in the hierarchy 
of personal rights, since they are the very founda¬ 
tions of democratic institutions.-*-® 
So abrupt was the change that in 1951, Justice Jackson declared: 
Essential freedoms are today threatened from without 
and within. It may become difficult to preserve here 
what a large part of the world has lost — the right 
to speak even temperately in matters vital to spirit 
and body.-*--*- 
Determining the threat of the loyalty test to civil liberties requires 
not only taking into account the number of persons unjustly dismissed or 
denied employment as a result of it or even the number subjected to charges, 
but must include the overall impact. Viewing the question this way, "there 
is found on the face of the document and also in the way it has been imple¬ 
mented, a threat to the freedoms protected by the First Amendment to the Consti¬ 
tution and also to the basic principle of due process of law viewed as the 
large untechnical concept which represents the permanent and pervasive feeling 
T p 
of our society as to what is right and just." 
"Freedom of association found to be an inherent necessity of a living 
democracy is similarly threatened by the provisions of the Loyalty Order which 
make membership in affiliation with or sympathetic association with any organi¬ 
zation listed by the Attorney General a test of loyalty."13 
In 1953, President Eisenhower revised the "loyalty" program of the 
Truman Administration and instituted by executive order a more inclusive 
"security risk" program. The Eisenhower "Security" program was designed to 
^Robert K. Carr, "Civil Rights in America," The Annals of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science, CCLXXV (May, 195l), 117. 
~*--*~Kunz v. New York, 340 U. S. 290 (1951). 
12 
Carr, op. cit., p. 120. 
13Ibid., p. 121. 
30 
eliminate government employees who were security risks, although not neces¬ 
sarily disloyal. "And, by seeking to reenforce the distinction between dis¬ 
loyalty and security risk, the program sought to take some of the onus off 
being fired from a federal job."-^ The new order accepted the previous 
loyalty test for public employment, but extended on a government-wide basis 
the right to remove security risks, a classification which includes heavy 
drinkers, the loose-tongued, sexual deviates, and other unreliable individuals. 
The Eisenhower program set up as the basic test of employee fitness a 
finding that "retention in employment in the federal service of the person 
being investigated is clearly consistent with the interests of national 
security." In the administration of this program, departmental loyalty 
boards and security officers are not limited to the use of the Attorney 
General's list. "In 1956, the Supreme Court reduced the scope of the program 
by holding that the law which authorized the order was applicable only to 
persons employed in positions concerned with the national safety and that it 
was invalid to the extent that it covered non-sensitive positions."^ 
A person alleged to be a security risk is given a 
hearing before a board of three government employees, 
none of whom serve the same agency as the employee 
whose case is under consideration. Prior to such 
hearings, the employee is notified in writing of the 
derogatory information against him. He may be re¬ 
presented by counsel of his choice and may present 
witnesses. He is also permitted to cross-examine 
such witnesses as appear against him, but if they do not 
appear voluntarily, he cannot have them subpoenaed. 
Newman, op. cit., p. 37» 
1^Cole v. Young, 351 U. S. 536 (1956). 
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In most cases, he isn't given the names of his in¬ 
formants. This strikes many fair-minded men as a 
denial of due process of law. It is no satisfactory 
answer to say that it is not a criminal proceeding. 
The punishment by loss of job and reputation is no g 
less grievous than fine or imprisonment by the courts. u 
One of the principal criticisms, however, of the security risk program 
is in the failure of those who administer it to distinguish clearly between 
loyalty and security cases. "Some of the security risks are subversives, 
disloyal persons; others are drunks, 'bean spillers,' and so on, whose loyalty 
has not been questioned. A majority of the 'let go' have been the letter 
IT 
type, but in the popular mind such individuals are lumped with subversives." 1 
One of the fundamental rights guaranteed by due process of law is the 
right to have criminal statutes defined clearly and definitely those acts 
which are declared to be crimes. Essential justice requires that a person 
not be punished for committing an offense so vaguely defined that a reasonable 
man could not commit the crime without knowing it. It is clear that in de¬ 
termining whether a person is a Communist, a subversive, or a disloyal person, 
there should be definitions or criteria by which to decide whether he falls 
into one of these groups. Efforts to define subversion and disloyalty reveal 
vagueness and confusion in the standards by which persons are judged to be 
subversive or disloyal. 
As can well be noted, persons are denied due process of the law. "Due 
process requires that a person receive notice of charge or claim against him 
and that, on demand, he be furnished with a bill of particulars specifying 
Loyalty Proceedings, Report of the Commission on Government Security 
(Washington, 1953), p. 66. 
IT 
Johnson, op. cit., p. 589» 
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the exact nature of such charge or claim. Secondly, due process requires an 
atmosphere in which a fair hearing can be conducted. Thirdly, confessions 
extorted by third degree methods or by fraud or trickery are inconsistent 
~j ^ 
with due process as perjured testimony." When a person accused cannot be 
given the name of his informants, nor compel witnesses to appear, he is not 
given a fair trial, thus, he is being denied due process of the law. 
Congress, Presidents, and the attorney generals, all 
deny that the loyalty-security programs designed to 
keep the public service free from subversives are 
intended to impose or do impose restraints on the 
First Amendment rights of public servants. However, 
Federal inquiry into what a public employee reads 
sees, publishes, and so on — an inquiry made in an 
effort to discover if he has such possibly unorthodox 
political or economic views as to make his continued 
employment not 'clearly consistent with the interests 
of the national security' is bound to restrain public 
employees from the kind of speaking or writing which 
would make them controversial figures....^ 
Since about 1938; legislative bodies and a large segment of the public 
have placed great faith in loyalty oaths as a means of protecting the country 
from subversives. Most students of civil liberty argue that the oath is both 
futile and an encroachment upon individual freedom. The futility of the oath 
can be observed in the following statement: 
Both in demanding an oath and taking it, we perpetuate 
the ridiculous illusion that enemies can be kept out 
through this prayer-wheel system. The fact is that 
deliberate traitors and subversives are the very ones 
who are not afraid to disguise their motivations and 
hide their intentions behind prescribed formulations. 
Nor are they afraid of perjury charges. They feel no 
18 
°Wewman, op. cit., p. 57* 
■^Cushman, Civil Liberties in the United States, op. cit., p. 29- 
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hesitation in signing an oath if it is opportune for 
them to do so. For them, words and oaths are only 
tools which have no binding moral value.^ 
However, as a requirement for public employment it probably violates no 
constitutional rights, for governments can fix the terms under which they 
will choose their employees. The validity of the oath comes into serious 
question when it is required in relation to activities somewhat removed from 
the public interest. Section 9 (h) of the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 required 
union officials to sign non-Communist affidavits as a condition of using the 
facilities of the National Labor Relations Board. "Although the Supreme 
Court admitted that Congress has undeniably discouraged the lawful exercise 
of political freedom, it sustained the constitutionality of the affidavit 
requirement, presumably because it believed the requirement would reduce the 
2i 
number of strikes and thus be justified in the public interest." 
In both 1952 and 1953; hut not thereafter, Congress, in making appro¬ 
priations for public housing, barred from federal housing units persons who 
were members of any organization designated by the Attorney General as sub¬ 
versive. "Housing authorities required tenants to swear that they were not 
members of any such organizations. Such a requirement would seem to consti¬ 
tute an interference with the rights of the individual without producing any 
pp 
compensating public benefit." 
The National Defense Education Act of 1958 furnishes one of the best 
examples of the loyalty oath requirement. Any student who receives a loan 
20William 0. Douglas, The Right of the People (New York, 1958), p. 135* 
^American Communications Association v. Douds, 339 U. S. 94 (1951)- 
pp 
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or fellowship and any other individual who receives payments under the act 
must file an affidavit that he does not believe in, and is not a member of, and 
does not support any organization that believes in or teaches the overthrow 
of the United States' Government by force or violence or by any illegal or 
unconstitutional methods. This loyalty oath requirement has been roundly 
criticized. "No good citizen would argue that disloyal persons should 
receive either loans or grants from the government, but many do assert that 
the disclaimer requirement does not weed out the disloyal but only arouses 
the scruples of the loyal, at least of the sensitive and conscientious among 
them.”23 
"The loyalty oaths are regarded by many people as a slur on their 
integrity, in addition to the denial of due process of law and freedom of 
24 
speech in certain instances." 
"Mr. Justice Black, in his dissent in Communications Association v. 
Douds, 339 U. S. 448, spoke of the loyalty oaths as the implacable foes of 
free thought. "They were oppressive to the conscience of man. They were 
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INVASION OF INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS BY 
LEGISLATIVE INVESTIGATIONS 
"No Congressional investigating committee in history has provoked more 
controversy or criticism than has the un-American Activities Committee of the 
House of Representatives. No such Committee has been more bitterly attacked 
or more vigorously defended."'1' 
To some Americans, it has constituted one of the 
gravest threats to civil liberty our nation has ever 
known; in less than a decade, it has managed to 
create and impose a loyalty standard upon the nation 
that has dangerously narrowed our traditional freedoms 
of thought, expression, and association. To other 
Americans, the committee has been our chief bulwark 
against subversion; almost singlehandedly, it has 
saved the nation against enslavement by the Commu¬ 
nists.^ 
The un-American Activities Committee of the House of Representatives 
was created in 1938 by a House Resolution as a temporary investigating 
committee. Taking its name from its chairman, Representative Martin Dies of 
Texas, it remained in existence until the end of 1944. 
In January, 1945? the committee was made a standing one of the House 
of Representatives. "The committee has...so conducted itself as to attract 
a maximum of attention, praise, and denunciation /since its permanent 
establishment/. The committee has repeatedly asserted that America is in 
"''Robert K. Carr, The House Committee on un-American Activities (New 





great danger, its institutions threatened with corruption by subversives."3 
In part the controversy that has raged about the 
committee has been of its own making. From the com¬ 
mittee has come reports of labor unions captured by 
Communists in their midst, government agencies over¬ 
run by spies, the secrets of American science be¬ 
trayed at one moment by eminent scholars and a motion 
picture industry shot through with Communist directors, 
actors, and script writers. Often the committee has 
taken credit for sensational developments on the 
American scene. Without its labors, President Truman 
would not in 19^7 have established the loyalty program 
in the federal service, and the most far-reaching laws 
against subversion in American history would not today 
be found upon the federal statute book. 
"For example, the McCarran Act of 1950 was in large measure based upon 
the findings and recommendations of the un-American Activities Committee."'* 
"Small wonder, then, that the un-American Activities Committee has become 
perhaps the best known investigating committee in the history of Congress."^ 
"Throughout the years since its creation in 19^5> as a standing com¬ 
mittee, the major interest of the un-American Activities Committee has been 
the Communist Party and the alleged subversive activity in which party 
7 
members and fellow travelers have engaged."1 
There have been attacks upon the House Committee. It has been held 
that the specific authority of the committee brings it in conflict with the 
3Ibid. 
^Ibid., p. 2. 
^Robert K. Carr, American Democracy in Theory and Practice (New York, 
1956), p. 193. 
g 
Carr, The House Committee on un-American Activities (New York, 1952), 
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Ibid., p. 27. 
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First Amendment — that freedom of speech, press, and assembly is encroached 
upon. In proceedings under the House un-American Activities Committee, 
witnesses have been denied the right to counsel, to make statements for the 
record, in other words, they have been denied due process of the law. 
The Committee has insisted upon personalizing its undertakings. It 
has, furthermore, interferred with traditional court procedures in criminal 
cases. The Committee has sometimes seemed more interested in exposing 
allegedly subversive persons than it has in exposing subversive activity. 
The House Committee must be held responsible for having encouraged a wide¬ 
spread witch-hunting spirit both in government and in private life. This 
spirit reached its peak in the shameful attacks made by Senator McCarthy upon 
federal employees and private persons. "By constantly exaggerating the sub¬ 
versive threat, the Committee has impaired the good judgement of many intel- 
g 
ligent citizens." "The Committee has adversely affected the moral and in¬ 
tellectual atmosphere of the nation. This is done by constantly reiterating 
the idea that our social structure is honeycombed with disloyal persons."^ 
As the Hew York Herald Tribune put it, the Committee "has endlessly confused 
and diverted attention from a rational approach to the true problems of 
Communist conspiracy in a democracy. 
The McCarthy Committee, in actuality, is the Senate Permanent Sub¬ 
committee on Investigations. Joseph McCarthy, a U. S. Senator from Wisconsin, 
Q 
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assumed the chairmanship of this Committee in January of 1953- His efforts 
were sc vigorous and he led what seemed to be a one-man committee against 
Communist infiltration in the government that his committee was referred to 
as the McCarthy Committee or McCarthyism. 
The question has been asked, what is McCarthyism? This question has 
been difficult to answer. However, in reference to McCarthyism, Thomas K. 
Finletter stated: 
An evil force is loose in the land. The leading 
spearhead and symbol of this force, at the moment, 
is a Senator. But the evil lies deeper than any one 
man. A small minority of Americans want to destroy 
our civil liberties in order to protect ourselves 
from Russian subversion — but in reality I wonder 
for what personal end or personal power?xl 
"McCarthy ran into rising opposition almost as soon as he sought out 
those he thought were Communists and subversives. Complaints began about 
the character of his charges and the way he conducted investigations. 
McCarthy believed that exposure for the sake of exposure was a proper ob¬ 
jective for a Congressional Committee."^ 
Joseph McCarthy was the man who personified McCarthyism. "McCarthyism 
is a technique of the Big Lie; a technique which seeks to effect a state of 
national paralysis by an unending and mounting stream of fantastic lies 
revolving around the central lie that our country is endangered by an internal 
and external Red menace."^ 
^^Mark Logan and Sam Douglas, "The Anatomy of McCarthyism," Political 
Affairs, XXXII (June, 1953), 12. 
T p 
Edward Bennett Williams, "The Final Irony of Joe McCarthy," Saturday 
Evening Post, June 9, 19^2, p. 22. 
^Logan and Douglas, op. cit., pp. 12-13- 
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McCarthyism is a method — a method of terror and 
frameup, of character assassination and guilt by 
association. Its victims are bullied and smeared. 
And those who refuse to be browbeaten, it seeks to 
destroy. But more than this, it is an instrument 
of compulsion and pressure, designed to counter and 
paralyze pcpular resistance, to soften up and pre¬ 
pare the ground for fascism and to force the nation 
along this path. '^ 
Senator McCarthy's appeal to unreason and lawlessness 
constitutes a threat to the stability of governmental 
institutions, to the prerogatives of government, and 
to the rights of the citizen as guaranteed by the 
Constitution. Above all, in its loose use of the 
charge of treason, it is a call to civil disunion 
and thus a threat to the peace of democratic 
society.-*-5 
"In the spring of 1954, "the furor over McCarthy's tactics reached a 
zenith when he attacked the security practices of the Department of Army and 
sharply criticized Brigadier General Ralph W. Zwicker.These attacks de¬ 
veloped into what became known as the Army-McCarthy hearings. McCarthy took 
a role much like that of a prosecuting attorney. The Army employed Joseph 
N. Welch, a distinguished Boston lawyer, to present its case. The battle 
lines were quickly drawn. It was McCarthy versus the Army. For thirty-six 
days, the hearings engrossed the attention of the nation. 
"McCarthy was a man who could never resist the temptation to touch a 
sign which said wet paint."He was himself the casualty of an investiga¬ 
tion that flouted the rules of fair play. 
14Ibid. 
James Rorty an 
195*0, P. 104. 
^ Williams, op- 
Ibid., p. 26. 
l8Ibid., p. 28. 
Moshe Decter, McCarthy 
cit., p. 22. 
and the Communists (Boston, 
4c 
A survey of McCarthy's activities in the brief period 
of his committee chairmanship leaves one with a feel¬ 
ing of wonder and amazement at the extent of his suc¬ 
cessful assaults on the stability of government 
institutions. We have seen the effects of the damage 
he has inflicted, in terms of morale, security pro¬ 
cedures, manpower recruitment, and the day-to-day 
operation of the State Department, the_Foreign Service, 
the Army, and the information program.^-9 
Long ago, in 1885, the abuses of the investigating committees were 
noticed by Woodrow Wilson. "It is said that some committees take so much 
time for their investigations that the subject is dead before a report is 
submitted; that others impose an unnecessary burden upon executive agencies 
and yet enable a politically right agency to enjoy immunity; and that still 
PC) 
others go on a wild and feverish manhunt and do not stop at cannibalism. 
It has been specifically charged that such committees as the House un- 
American Activities Committee and the Senate Permanent Sub-committee on In¬ 
ternal Security have invaded individual rights. "The charge has been voiced 
by editors, bar associations, churchmen, civic leaders, and congressmen 
themselves."21 
Robert K. Carr has stated that: 
Serious violations of civil liberty result from the 
exercise by legislative committees of the power to 
ferret out and publicize the alleged disloyalty or 
subversive conduct of individuals. 
In exposing the disloyalty of individual persons, 
these committees are trying to do a job for which a 
legislative committee, no matter how good, is in¬ 
herently -unfitted, and in the doing of which civil 
■^Rorty and Decter, op. cit., pp. 104-105. 
^Cited in George B. Galloway, The Legislative Process in Congress (New 
York, 1953), PP- 628-629. 
~*~rbid., pp. 629-630. 
liberties will almost inevitably be destroyed. From 
the beginning, exposure has been one of the major 
purposes of the Committee. But to expose an indivi¬ 
dual, either a government employee or a private 
citizen, by leveling against him in the newspapers 
accusations of disloyalty, is to convict him in the 
public mind of treasonable conduct, and thereby 
destroy his reputation beyond any hope of recovery. 
He has not been convicted of a crime in a technical 
sense, but he stands branded before the world as a 
disloyal if not traitorous person, he will almost 
certainly be dismissed from the job he holds, and he 
is likely to be barred from employment in the future. 
He becomes a pariah; and to say that he has not been 
punished for a crime by a legislative, and therefore 
political, body is to quibble with words.^ 
In a dissenting opinion in the Barsky case,^ Judge Henry W. Edgerton 
said that the investigation restricts freedom of speech by uncovering and 
advertising expressions of unpopular views. Speaking of the House Committee 
of un-American Activities which questioned Dr. Barsky, he said: 
The Committee and its members have repeatedly said in 
terms or in effect that its main purpose is to do by 
exposure and publicity what it believes may not 
validly be done by legislation.... Congressional 
action that is either intended or likely to restrict 
expression of opinion that Congress may not prohibit 
violates the First Amendment. Congressional action 
in the nature of investigation is no exception. 
Civil liberties may not be abridged in order to de¬ 
termine whether they should be abridged. 
Robert E. Cushman has voiced the opinion that: 
These Committees may be described as un-American 
Committees for the un-American investigation of 
un-American activities. 
22 
Robert K. Carr, "Civil Rights in America," The Annals of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science, CCLXXV (May, 1951). 3-4. 
^Barsky v. Board of Regents, 3^2 U. S. ^22 (1951). 
p]i 
Allan Barth, "When Congress Investigates," Public Affairs Pamphlet, 
Ko. 227 (October, 1955); p. 6. 
b2 
The Dies Committee...makes no effort to establish the 
credibility of its witnesses.... These persons have 
been allowed to read into the record accusations 
against persons who were fully prepared to prove the 
falseness of the charges, but who were not permitted 
by the Committee to do so. As all of these proceedings 
take place in a glare of newspaper publicity, the pub¬ 
lic mind is being steadily poisoned by the reiteration 
of this irresponsible testimony. It leaves a vague but 
indelible impression that those active in the ranks of 
organized labor, or associated with it, together with 
most liberal writers and teachers, are Communists at 
least and are bent on overthrowing the Constitution 
and Government of the United States.^5 
"Legislatures are guardians of the liberties of the people in quite 
26 
as great a degree as the courts." Men chosen by the people have a greater 
responsibility than anybody else to watch over the liberties of the people. 
"Important among those liberties is the freedom of a citizen to stay home, 
minding his own affairs and to keep those affairs to himself. Congress 
interferes enormously with that freedom when it orders a citizen, without 
his consent, to drop everything and spend hours or days disclosing his 
affairs to strangers."^ 
"Perhaps the most serious damage done by the Committee to civil 
liberties has resulted from their efforts to personalize their hearings. 
Often their chief purpose has seemed to be to point a finger of suspicion 
or guilt at particular individuals and see them punished for their wrong- 
pQ 
doing." 0 Also, this personalizing of hearings can be viewed as a quest 
25 
Robert E. Cushman, "Safeguarding our Civil Liberties," Public Affairs 
Pamphlet (February, 19^0 ), 6-8. 
^Zechariah Chafee, The Blessings of Liberty (New York, 1956), p. 220. 
27 
Ibid., pp. 220-221. 
^^Robert K. Carr, American Democracy in Theory and Practice (New York, 
1956), p. 19^- 
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for power and prestige by the Committee. 
"In recent years, a large number of witnesses before committees 
investigating subversive influences have pleaded the privilege against 
self-incrimination rather than answer questions about Communist associations. 
The plan has been represented by some Congressional investigators as a con¬ 
clusive admission of guilt. Such a view accords scant respect to the in¬ 
telligence of those who incorporated the privilege in the Bill of Rights."^ 
Furthermore, the brutal and ignorant application of this doctrine of guilt 
bjr association as a test of loyalty in our present drive against Communism 
has threatened the civil liberties of thousands of patriotic Americans. 
"The complete conviction with which loyalty boards and legislative committees 
assume that a Communist is somehow afflicted with a sort of contagion which 
inevitably infects all persons who come in contact with him or share any of 
his ideas, even though they are not his Communistic ideas, is the real 
meaning of the term as it is applied.'0^ 
Two events of 1953 have an important bearing on the case of Congres¬ 
sional investigations versus individual rights. In United States v. 
Rumelev,31 the Supreme Court overruled the conviction of the executive 
secretary of the Committee on Constitutional Government, who refused to 
answer a House Committee's question regarding purchasers of alleged propa¬ 
ganda books. The majority opinion relied on a narrow construction of Con¬ 
gressional intent in authorising the particular investigation, but the 
2Q 
Barth, op. cit., p. 9* 
Carr, op. cit., pp. 0-7. 
31345 U. S. 41 (1953). 
concurring opinion invoked the freedom of the press as the grounds for freeing 
Mr. Rumeley. The other event of 1953 was the enactment of a law granting 
immunity to witnesses testifying before Congressional Committees. The grant 
was confined to probes of threats to national security or defense, and 
subject to approval by the federal district court in either case. 
In 195o, Professor Robert S. Cushman, a leading authority on civil 
liberties, systematically outlined the encroachments of the investigating 
committees upon them. While the list is not exhaustive, the following are 
the more important abuses which became embedded in the procedures of these 
committees. They have not occurred all the time, nor have they all been 
present at once in any legislative investigation. 
(A) Denial of the traditional rights of witnesses. 
Committees are free to follow their own whims in 
dealing with witnesses, and since these inquiries 
into subversion are often in reality 'legislative 
trials', denial of the rights traditionally guaran¬ 
teed to witnesses, not to mention defendants, works 
serious injustice. 
Among these rights may be listed the right to ade¬ 
quate notice of the hearing, with some indication of 
its purpose; sufficient time to secure counsel and 
the right to take advice of counsel at the hearing; 
the right to make a statement which shall become 
part of the record; the right to testify freely and 
to explain his answers to questions asked of him; 
the right to reply fully to charges or accusations 
made against him; the right to a transcript at 
reasonable expense of his own testimony. 
Investigating committees, like loyalty and 
security boards, have refused to disclose the full 
text of accusations made by confidential informers 
and to produce those anonymous accusers in open 
hearing. The injustice and hardship resulting from 
this refusal may be extremely serious. 
(B) Abuses of Publicity 
^5 
Committees investigating subversion have usually- 
conducted their open hearings in a blaze of publicity. 
This publicity has often been nationwide through news¬ 
papers, reports, radio and even television. It is a 
serious injustice, however, for a committee to give 
this nation-wide publicity in advance to accusations, 
insinuations, or suspicions directed against a person 
who frequently is not accorded a fair opportunity to 
answer back and whose defense, if he has one, will 
never catch up with the original headlines accusing 
him. Committees have sometimes misused publicity in 
another way. After a witness has testified in a 
secret session of the committee, the chairman, or 
other member, has released to the press selected 
parts of his secret testimony. The witness is some¬ 
times unfairly or inadequately presented to the 
public in this way and the resulting injustice may be 
very great. 
(C) 'Name dropping' by 'friendly witnesses.' 
Investigating committees frequently seek the aid of 
professional informers, usually ex-Communists, from 
whom much valuable information seems clear. The 
Committee, however, sometimes uses these informers in 
ways which cannot be so easily defended. They appear 
as 'friendly' witnesses, testify publicly, and often 
without interruption or cross examination, sprinkling 
the record with the names of persons whom they accuse 
as, or whom they suspect of being, Communists or sub¬ 
versives. Persons who are the victims of the irrespon¬ 
sible 'name dropping' may be entirely innocent. 
(D) One Man Committee Hearings. 
Committee hearings conducted by the chairman alone, 
or by any single member, date back to the days of the 
Dies Committee. Some of the most flagrant invasions 
of the witnesses' right to essential fair play have 
occurred in these one-man hearings. 
(E) Allowing Improper Use of Committee Files. 
The files assembled by legislative investigating 
committees are official government records. They are 
the property of the government, to be used in the 
official work of the committee or other agencies of 
the government. These files contain information 
about thousands of individuals. The House Committee 
on un-American Activities from time to time allowed 
access to its files, or released information from 
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its files, to persons not connected with the govern¬ 
ment. Such bootlegging of the contents of official, 
confidential documents inflicts a serious injustice 
upon those whose names are thus improperly released 
to outsiders.32 
It seems unlikely that an accused person could be accorded procedural 
fairness or a fair trial in a hearing before investigating committees when 
the abuses of these committees are so numerous and far-reaching. 
"It is no longer open to doubt that the First Amendment protects free¬ 
dom of speech, press, and assembly, not only when legislatures enact laws 
which abridge those rights, but also when legislative committees conduct in¬ 
vestigations abridging these freedoms."33 The Court, speaking through Mr. 
Chief Justice Warren, said in Watkins v. United States, 35^- U. S. 178, 197: 
Clearly, an investigation is subject to the command 
that the Congress shall make no law abridging free¬ 
dom of speech or press or assembly. While it is 
true that there is no statute to be reviewed, and 
that an investigation is not a law, nevertheless an 
investigation is part of law-making. It is justified 
solely as an adjunct to the legislative process. The 
First Amendment may be invoked against infringement 
of the protected freedoms by law or by law-making. 
Abuses of the investigative process may imper¬ 
ceptibly lead to abridgement of protected freedoms. 
The mere summary of a witness and compelling him to 
testify, against his will, about his beliefs, ex¬ 
pressions or associations is a measure of govern¬ 
mental interference. 3^- 
Committees have not hesitated to put witnesses on legislative trials, 
find them guilty, and punish them in the sense of destroying their reputa¬ 
tions and robbing them of their means of earning a living. It is possible 
3%obert E. Cushman, Civil Liberties in the United States (New York, 
1956), pp. 195-197. 
^William 0. Douglas, The Right of the People (New York, 1958), P* 103. 
34Ibid. 
that society is discovering new and effective ways of punishing wrongdoers 
and that Congressional Committees are becoming willing agencies through 
which such punishment is imposed. "Whether the measure of National Security 
safeguarded by these investigating committees is sufficient to offset the 
threat to civil liberty inherent in their activity is a question that the 
O CT 
citizen is well advised to ponder carefully. 
Since Cushman drew up his indictment, there have been substantial im¬ 
provements in the conduct of Congressional investigating committees, and 
there has been a growing probability that Congress itself will take effective 
action. "Public interest in such investigations has waned, a factor which 
makes the investigation of subversive activities a less productive political 
'gold mine'."'"1' Then there has been some tightening up of the rules 
governing committees. For example, House Amendments of 1955 to Pule XI, 
Section 25, require, among other things, an announcement by the chairman at 
an investigative hearing of the subject of the investigation; the presence 
of at least two committee members for taking testimony; recognition of a 
witness' right to counsel for the purpose of advising him concerning his 
Constitutional rights; and an executive closed session when the committee 
determines that open testimony may tend to defame, degrade or incriminate any 
17 
person." 
jyCarr, American Democracy in Theory and Practice, op. cit., pp. 194-195* 
3°Claudius Johnson, American National Government (New York, i960), p. 492. 
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nO 
In the case of Watkins v. United States, the Court explained that it 
is not sufficient authority for a committee that a subject under investigation 
be one on which Congress may legislate. It is essential that the instruction 
to an investigating committee spell out that group's jurisdiction and pur¬ 
pose with sufficient particularity. The instructions authorized the committee 
to make periodic investigations of (l) "the extent, character and objects 
of un-American propaganda activities in the United States, (2) the diffusion 
within the United States of subversive and un-American propaganda that is 
instigated from foreign countries or of a domestic origin and attacks the 
principle of the form of government as guaranteed by our Constitution, and 
(3) all other questions in relation thereto that would aid Congress in any 
i.39 
necessary remedial legislation. 
où 
354 u. s. 178 (1957). 
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Johnson, op. cit., p. 492. 
CHAPTER V 
ANALYSIS OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF FEDERAL 
ANTI-SUBVERSIVE MEASURES 
The far-reaching consequences of the Espionage Act of 1917* the Alien 
Registration Act of 1940, and the Internal Security Act of 1950; have been 
the restriction of freedom of speech, press and assembly. The Internal 
Security Act has also restricted the freedom of movement of American citizens 
who have legitimate reasons for going abroad. Its Emergency Detention 
Section has caused the detaining of persons, citizens or aliens, who have 
been convicted of no crime, but who are deemed to be potentially dangerous 
to the security of the United States. The compulsory registration of "Com¬ 
munist front organizations" as required by the Act restricts the normal educa¬ 
tional activities and processes of forming views on public questions because 
of the expression and exchange of opinions without any necessary relation 
to any unlawful action. 
Such restrictions as these measures place on our civil liberties seem 
to constitute a confession that we have lost our faith in the basic principles 
upon which they rest. "We are afraid to expose our democratic institutions 
and principles to the dangers of public and hostile criticism. We no longer 
trust the intelligence and the integrity of our people to see the difference 
between ^communism/ and democracy and to repudiate the one and cleave to the 
other. We no longer believe in the power of truth and decency and honor to 
prevail in what Mr. Justice Holmes called the 'competition of the marketplace'." 
‘'“Robert E. Cushman, "Civil Liberty After the War," American Political 
Science Review, XXXVIII (February, 1944)f q8. 
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We have, in short, become skeptical of the capacity of democracy to hold its 
own against the competition of -undemocratic doctrine. "We can no longer 
trust ourselves to listen to talk, or read printed material, which offends 
us or which criticizes or attacks our institutions. We will no longer let 
people say out loud the things we do not like to hear, all this seems a 
very tragic aftermath of a titanic struggle in which the democracies of the 
2 
world have proved their strength and their capacity to survive." 
The right of all persons to express themselves is essential to a 
democratic society. "The very idea of democracy assumes the existence of an 
intelligent public opinion and the ability of the people to make sound de¬ 
cisions about social problems."-3 But this is possible only where there is 
a free marketplace of thought in which men are free to speak their minds on 
all sorts of subjects. For the Federal Government to restrict the provisions 
of the First Amendment through its anti-subversive measures would deny men 
the opportunity to speak freely on all sorts of issues. "If there were but 
one wise or correct way of dealing with each social issue, an authoritarian 
government might safely curb the rights of individuals to discuss alternative 
ways. But there is seldom final 'truth' with respect to social problems. 
i. 
There are only 'good' ways and 'bad' ways of acting." So, in a democracy 
the people discuss their problems, they weigh the results of experiments, 
they listen to all points of view, and then by majority vote they try to 
devise "good" ways of acting. 
2Ibid. 
o 
3Robert K. Carr, American Democracy in Theory and Practice (New York, 
1956), p. 170. 
^Ibid. 
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If we deny freedom of public discussion to anti-democratic groups, we 
may actually, in the long-run, increase rather than diminish the danger to 
the public security. By such suppression, we drive these people under 
cover, and we make it infinitely more difficult to know who they are, how 
strong they are, and what they are up to. Groups which are allowed to talk 
and to print can at least be identified and counted and watched. "They are 
less dangerous when we know about them than when they are driven to hide in 
cellars and to wear false whiskers."^ 
Central to all liberty is the right to speak one's mind and to commu¬ 
nicate one's ideas through all available media of expression. "Clear and 
present danger" has become merely a convenient excuse for suppression. It 
is not enough that the words excite people or cause unrest or disturbance. 
As the Court said in Terminiello v. Chicago: 
...a function of free speech under our system of 
government is to invite dispute. It may indeed 
best serve its high purpose when it induces a 
condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with 
conditions as they are, or even stirs people to 
anger. Speech is often provocative and challeng¬ 
ing. It may strike at prejudices and preconceptions 
and have profound unsettling effects as it presses 
for acceptance of an idea.0 
The First Amendment does not say that there is freedom of expression 
provided the talk is not "dangerous." It does not say that there is freedom 
of expression provided the utterance has no tendency to subvert. "It does 
not put speech and freedom of press in the category of housing, sanita¬ 
tion, factory conditions, and the like, and make it subject to regulation 
^Cushman, op. cit., p. 19* 
°337 U. S. 1 (19^9). 
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for the public good. Nor does it permit legislative restraint of freedom 
of expression so long as the regulation does not offend due process."^ All 
notions of regulation or restraint by government are absent from the First 
Amendment. For it says in words that are not ambiguous, "Congress shall 
make no law...abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press...." 
However, we must bear in mind that there are some accepted forms of 
government regulation of speech and press. For example, punishment for 
slander and libel, obscenity and blasphemy, etc. 
Freedom of assembly is part of the First Amendment and is as important 
to freedom of expression as free speech and free press themselves. To deny 
the freedom of people to assemble would, in essence, deny them freedom of 
expression. As Chief Justice Hughes said in DeJonge v. Oregon: "The right 
of peaceable assembly is a right cognate to those of free speech and free 
O 
press and is equally fundamental." So long as the meeting is orderly and 
lawful, the right of assembly cannot be denied because the gathering of 
people together often creates problems which, though incidental to freedom 
of expression and freedom of assembly, must be subject to some control in 
the interests of peace and quiet or law and order. 
The Loyalty Program presents us with a picture which shows lack of 
definiteness of loyalty and security. A person could be branded as disloyal 
to the United States and deprived of his job, or utterances so vaguely de¬ 
scribed that he could not possibly have foreseen that they would constitute 
^William 0. Douglas, The Right of The People (New York, 1958), p. 187. 
8299 U. S. 353 (1937). 
disloyalty. It has long been established that definitions of crime must 
be clear and definite, not vague and fuzzy. "Due process of law requires 
this definiteness, on the theory that a man may not be justly punished under 
a lew so vaguely worded that a reasonable man cannot tell when he is violating 
it."° In determining whether a person is a Communist, a subversive, or a 
disloyal person, there should be definitions or criteria by which to decide 
whether he falls into one of these groups. 
The operation of the loyalty program further denies to a person the 
presumption of innocence under guilt is proven, due process of the law, im¬ 
munity against double jeopardy and the right of the accused to confront his 
accusers. Also, freedom of association is restricted. 
The loyalty oaths have been an infringement upon freedom of speech, 
conscience, and thought. Likewise, they have been a denial of due process of 
the law. 
The consequences of investigating committees have been restriction of 
freedom of speech, interference with traditional criminal procedures and 
curtailment of freedom of association. 
The essence of democracy is that one's personal liberty cannot be 
disturbed except by "due process of law." Due process which guarantees 
justice to every person is indispensable in a democracy. Ko matter how 
serious the crime, a man may be accused of committing or how acute the situa¬ 
tion, he is entitled to have the question of his guilt or innocence answered 
^Robert E. Cushman, Civil Liberties in The United States (New York, 
1956), P. 148. 
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with maximum fairness and justice both to himself and to society. 
Invoking the privilege against self-incrimination in loyalty proceed¬ 
ings and before investigating committees has generally been associated in 
the public mind with guilt of subversion. "The significance of the privilege 
has perhaps been greatest in connection with resistance to prosecution of 
such offenses as heresy or political crimes. In these areas the privilege 
against self-incriminâtion has been a protection for freedom of thought."^ 
Invoking the privilege, however, has been related to the doctrine of "guilt 
by association." Clearly, a man's associations may suggest evidence of his 
views, but not necessarily. 
While the Bill of Rights makes no mention of association 
and our founding fathers looked with suspicion upon such 
associations as they were acquainted with, there can be 
little doubt that they recognized the right to associate 
as a liberty of Americans. When men band together for a 
single public demonstration of feeling or expression of 
a grievance, they exercise their right to assembly; when 
they continue banding and acting together until the 
grievance is redressed, they exercise their right to 
association. 
Freedom of indefinite or permanent association is as fundamental to 
democracy and as much a liberty of Americans as freedom of assembly, and 
no less entitled to Constitutional protection. 
There are three dangers which result from the way in which we are 
currently applying the doctrine of guilt by association. "The first and 
most obvious of these lies in the injustice which it works upon the honest 
and patriotic liberal who finds himself branded as disloyal because of 
^Erwin Griswold, The 5th Amendment Today (Cambridge, 19b5)> pp. 8-9. 
^Leo Pfeffer, The Liberties of an American (Washington, 1956), p. 111. 
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associations innocently entered into in the past. These rise up like long- 
12 
buried skeletons to destroy his reputation and cost him his job." "The 
second danger is that it bullies thousands of men and women of good will 
into refraining from freely and normally supporting various social and 
humanitarian causes because Communists make it their fixed policy to support 
IS 
these same causes." 
In the third place, guilt by association actually 
jeopardizes the national security, ironical as 
that may seem. It does so by hopelessly confusing 
the public mind on the matter of who is and who is 
not disloyal. Some of the most distinguished 
patriotic, and useful men and women in American 
public life have been branded as fellow travelers 
or Communistic sympathizers on the flimsy ground 
that at some stage of their careers they belonged 
to organizations now labeled 'Communist front'; 
How can the ordinary citizen avoid being puzzled 
by all this? If we persist in confusing honest 
liberals with Communists and traitors, we are in 
danger of destroying the civil liberties of the 
former, while we jeopardize our safety by failing 
to identify the latter. 
4 
The Fifth Amendment states that "no person shall...be subject for the 
same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." This means that 
a person put on trial for a crime in a Federal court may not thereafter be 
tried for the same crime, whether he is acquitted, or convicted and punished. 
Subjecting a person to double jeopardy places an undue burden on him and 
also forces him to the glare of publicity which otherwise could have been 
12 
Robert K. Carr, "Civil Rights in America," The Annals of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science, CCLXXV (May, 1951), 6-7. 
^rbid., p. 7. 
^Ibid., p. 7• 
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avoided. The stain on a person's career, reputation, and life is tragically 
forced deeper as a result of a second trial for the same crime. 
Under the Sixth Amendment, a defendant has the right to be confronted 
■with the witnesses against him and to have compulsory process (subpoena) to 
bring forth witnesses in his favor. Confrontation includes the right to 
cross-examine witnesses. The right to be confronted with one's witnesses 
is so essential to basic justice and fair play. If an accused person is 
denied this essential right, he is subjected to an unfair trial, and this 
is definitely not in accord with conventional democratic criminal procedures. 
At a time when the Senate Investigating Committee, under the chairman¬ 
ship of Joseph McCarthy, had engaged in a particularly egregious violation 
of civil liberty, President Eisenhower told a press conference: 
In this country, if some one dislikes you or accuses 
you, he must come up in front. He cannot hide be¬ 
hind the shadows, he cannot assassinate you or your 
character from behind without suffering the penalties 
an outraged citizenry will inflict.... The American 
code, the President continued, encompasses the right 
to meet your accuser face to face.^5 
We have had in this country instances of Congressional investigations 
which would do honor to the authoritarian system of the Communists. To be 
sure, such cases of the flagrant perversion of power in our society have been 
few by comparison. But in these instances, we have somewhat adopted the 
methods of our enemy. To a Communist society, such a system is appropriate: 
it protects Communism. To a free society, it can never be appropriate: it 
Pfeffer, op. cit., p. l8l. 
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does not protect freedom, it destroys it. 
"The First Amendment decrees that government has no concern with 
1 
thoughts and beliefs." The search for political heresy which the threat 
of Communism has engendered too rapidly identifies unorthodox thought and 
expression as Communistic. We have been too willing to sacrifice the rights 
of the unorthodox thinker to the search for Communists. We have been too 
quick to identify someone who supports unpopular causes and beliefs with 
Communism. In short, the fear of Communism has created an atmosphere which 
is antagonistic to a climate of tolerance for unorthodox thought and free 
communication of ideas which is so vital to a democracy. 
The only way to preserve 'the existence of free 
American institution1 is to make free institutions 
a living force. To ignore them in the very process 
of purporting to defend them, as frightened men 
urge, will leave us little worth defending. 
We must choose between freedom and fear — we 
cannot have both. If the citizens of the United 
States persist in being afraid, the real rulers of 
this country will be fanatics fired with zeal to 
save grown men from objectionable ideas by putting 
them under the care of Nursemaids. 
16. 






The Blessings of Liberty (New York, 1956), p. 156. 
CHAPTER VI 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States forbids 
Congress to make any law which shall abridge freedom of speech, press, 
and assembly. However, Congress has passed laws which restrict these free¬ 
doms through its attempt to check subversive activities. 
The first peacetime sedition laws to check subversives were enacted in 
1798• They were known as the Alien and Sedition Laws. These laws were 
passed to protect the United States Government against subversive elements 
which might begin because of a revolution in Europe at the time. 
Hie American Civil War, the first war after the adoption of our present 
Constitution which presented any real danger to our institutions, posed a 
problem to our civil liberties. President Lincoln took it upon himself to 
put z-estraints on some of our precious civil liberties. 
From 1865 until 1917> individuals enjoyed a reasonable amount of free- 
com from restraints on their civil liberties. But, in 19^7> Congx-ess ens.cted 
the Espionage Act. This was a wartime measure but was applicable in times 
of peace. The second peacetime measure which restricted civil liberties was 
enacted in 1940 and known as the Alien Registration or Smith Act. This 
measure as the Espionage Act was protection for the government against 
scandalous writings and speeches which might lead to the overthrow of the 
government. These measures caused individuals to be appx-ehensive about 
criticizing the government, for fear of being labeled as subversives. The 
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McCarran Act placed a more stringent limitation on the Civil liberties of the 
individual. Persons could not associate freely unless someone may say that 
they were conspiring to overthrow the government. Their freedom of assembly 
was impaired somewhat. Individuals could be detained by the government if 
they were thought to be likely to engage in espionage or sabotage. 
In enacting these laws, Congress must have had more fear of subversion 
than fear of abridging or infringing civil- liberties which are essential to 
the operation of a free democratic society. 
In March of 19^7> President Truman enacted his loyalty program for 
federal employees. Reasonable doubt became the password for non-admittance 
to government employment. One can ask himself, what is reasonable doubt? 
What are the criteria for determining reasonable doubt? Whose definition 
of reasonable doubt shall be followed? Reasonable doubt carries with it 
subjective elements as well as objective elements. However, in 1953> 
Eisenhower revoked Truman's program and instituted his own security risk 
program. He retained Truman's loyalty requirement for federal employment, 
though. But, he included drunks, sex deviates, etc. as security risks. In 
neither Truman's nor Eisenhower's program did they define the standards for 
loyalty and security. 
Loyalty oaths became prevalent as a means of gaining employment outside 
the Federal government and also in certain other instances. These loyalty 
oaths denied to the individual the due process of law. To a certain extent, 
The national Defense Act of 1958 was provided with a loyalty oath. 
The investigating committees have also invaded the civil liberties of 
the individual. In some proceedings, individuals have been denied due process 
6o 
of law. The most important committee for making investigations on subversives 
is the House un-American Activities Committee. This committee has been the 
subject of much discussion, defense, and criticisms over the years since its 
establishment in 1938• Efforts have been made to reform investigating committees 
These include tightening up of rules governing the committees and requiring 
committees to make periodic investigations. 
Even if anti-subversive measures are necessary to national security, 
they may be dangerous to our cherished civil liberties. They ignore the 
importance of respect for the general sense of fairness and ignore the fact 
that the rules of due process of law which have been developed through the 
centuries are paramount largely because they are directed to the discovery of 
truth and the maintenance of justice. Furthermore, they fail to recognize 
that the protection of our traditional liberties is itself a factor in the 
national security. 
Again, we must emphasize that the dangers of the loyalty-security 
programs are not limited to the possibility of injury to particular indivi¬ 
duals. The threat lies also in the probable wearing away of the right of 
due process of law and of the freedoms protected by the First Amendment. We 
must not forget that it is from these rights and freedoms that the citizens 
derive the power fundamental in a democracy, to meet his responsibility for 
the effective functioning of the government. 
The United States has an extremely difficult task, bordering on a 
grave dilemma. In order to do justice, we must appreciate the full dimensions 
and complexities of the issue. On the one hand, there is the necessity of 
advancing national security and protecting the country against subversive or 
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or potentially dangerous individuals and groups. The right of self-protection 
and self-preservation is inherent in any State. On the other hand, there is 
an equally significant and urgent task. Civil liberties must be preserved. 
Without them, victory over Communism or other subversive forces will be hollow 
and. indeed self-defeating. Communism does pose a potential danger to the 
country. But if, in the process or name of fighting Communism within our 
midst, we abandon our precious heritage of civil liberties, we will have de¬ 
stroyed the very conditions which make the struggle worthwhile and the victory 
meaningful. Victory over Communism will be justified only if it is a democratic 
and constitutional victory, achieved through democratic and constitutional 
means. Reverence for civil liberty and human rights should be at the bottom 
of all our efforts. 
The dilemma confronting America today, it should be recognized, is a 
vital part of the perennial problem of reconciling and balancing freedom and 
order, liberty and government, justice and security. The problem, therefore, 
is both immediate and ultimate, both timely and timeless. 
The balance has not been achieved. To a significant degree, order -and 
security have been given priority over liberty and freedom. 
"If the tensions of time demand some temporary sacrifices of our basic 
rights and freedoms, it is all the more necessary to be vigilant to keep 
that sacrifice to the minimum, otherwise, the outcome may prove to be a Pyrrhic 
. , „1 
victory. 
n 
xRobert K. Carr, "Civil Rights in America," The Annals of The American 
Academy of Political and Social Science, CCLXXV (May, 1951); 123. 
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